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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHARLES J. PRUCE,
Applicant-Appellant

- vs. FRUEHAUF CORPORATION
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY, and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
J

CASE
No. 12650

Defendants-Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant filed an application for hearing before the
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah and from the
Commission's order filed an Action for Review and Petition
for Writ of Certiorari.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH
The Industrial Commission denied the appellant's application and claim for Workman's Compensation benefits.
Thereafter, the appellant filed a Motion for Review which
Motion was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have the Utah State Supreme
Court set aside the Order of the Utah State Industrial Commission and enter an Order in favor of the appellant award1

ing the appellant Workman's Compensation benefits for his
injury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicant-appellant, Charles J. Pruce, is appoximately 63 years of age and is an employee of Fruehauf Corporation, located at 882 South Second West, Salt Lake City, Utah.
On the 31st day of April, 1968, the appellant while working
for his employer was involved in cranking down the trailer
support on a loaded trailer. The crank slipped out of gear
causing the appellant to suffer a jarring sensation to his neck
and head, causing pain in his neck and eventually giving him
a headache.
The appellant reported this incident to his employer that
evening and on the following day. (R-Page 37 through 40, Page
46 line 13 through Page 47 line 3) Two or three days after
the incident in question, the appellant began to notice problems with his eyes, resulting in a clouding and eventually an
inability to see out of the upper portion of his right eye. The
appellant saw Dr. Rees concerning this condition six days
after the alleged industrial accident although he had attempted to see the Doctor prior to that date but had been unable
to obtain an appointment. (R-Page 41 lines 5 through 25) The
appellant told Dr. Rees that he had experienced problems with
blurring in his eye and loss of vision. Dr. Rees examined
the appellant and determined that at that time he had a detached retina and the appellant was then hospitailzed and
subject to surgery to correct the detachment. The appellant
returned to work on July 5, 1968. Dr. Rees had treated the
appellant for minor eye problems between September 1, 1955,
and June 24, 1967. On June 24, 1967, the last time Dr. Rees
saw the appellant prior to the industrial accident, Dr. Rees
reported that the appellant did not have a detached retina.
(R-Page 230, lines 15 through page 231 line 2.) Dr. Rees did
not again see the appellant until after the industrial injury.
2

At the hearing held on the defendant's objecton to the medical panel's report, Dr. Rees testified that Mrs. Pruce, the appellant's wife, had stated that Mr. Pruce had experienced
problems with his eye for six weeks or a period of time.
(R-Page 69 lines 10 through 15) Mr. Pruce specifically denied that his wife ever made any such statement; and in
an affidavit filed during March of 1971, the appellant's wife
stated that she did not make any such statement to Dr. Rees.
(R-Page 228 lines 22 through 25, page 240 line 10, page 233)
On December 31, 1969, the appellant filed an application
for a hearing on an industrial accident claim. The application
came on for hearing before the Industrial Commission on
April 8, 1970. Thereafter, the appellant was referred to a
medical panel; and the medical panel issued a report stating,
"as a reasonable medical probability, the 'landing gear' episode would be a conspicuous cause of the detached retina."
(R-Page 172) On February 24, 1970, the defendant-respondent filed objections to the medical panel's report; and said
objections were heard on December 17, 1970. On February
19, 1971, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order denying relief to the appellant. (R-Page 294 through 299) On the 12th
day of March, 1971, the appellant filed a Motion for Review;
and on August 23, 1971, the appellant's Motion was denied.
(R-Page 334 through 335)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is the appellant's contention that the medical opinion
presented by Dr. Rees was founded entirely upon hearsay
evidence which was not admissible and incorrect. The evidence before the Industrial Commission did not support the
hearsay statement and the appellant, by his testimony, and
the appellant's wife, through her affidavit, specifically denied the truth of the hearsay relied upon by Dr. Rees. The
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orders of the Industrial Commission are based upon Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law which are not accurate and
are contrary to the evidence presented before the Industrial
Commission. The opinion of the medical panel which was appointed to examine the appellant supports the appellant's
claim; and, therefore, the appellant should be awarded Workman's Compensation benefits. Any doubt that exists in this
case should be resolved in favor of the appellant as required
by case law and by the Utah Workman's Compensation Act.
ARGUMENT
I.

THAT THE HEARING EXAMINER COMMITTED
PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ALLOWING HEARSAY
EVIDENCE TO BE INTRODUCED AT THE HEARING
ON THIS MATTER OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE
APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY AND IN ALLOWING
DR. ROBERT L. REES TO BASE HIS MEDICAL OPINIONS ON SAID HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
According to Mr. Sumsion, the hearing examiner, the
reason for denying the appellant's claim is that Dr. Rees,
the appellant's doctor, testified that in his opinion the appellant did not suffer a detached retina because of the Industrial accident but rather that the detached retina had developed over a period of time. The medical panel which examined
the appellant at the request of the hearing examiner stated,
"as a reasonable medical probability, the landing-gear episode would be the conspicuous cause of the detached retina .. "
(R-Page 172) Therefore, if for some reason Dr. Rees' opinion is not based upon sound factual admissible evidence then
the medical panel's report should be accepted and the appellant's claim should be granted.
It became very important to evaluate Dr. Rees' opinion

and the information upon which he bases his opinion. Attor4

ney Brandt, who represents the insurance company in this
matter, obtained opinions from both Dr. Sonntag, a member
of the medical panel, and Dr. Rees based upon a hypothetical
question which he presented to the doctors. That hypothetical question was first set up by Attorney Brandt on page 201
of the Hearing Report. The hypothetical question which Attorney Brandt presented to Mr. Sonntag is as follows:
Now, doctor, assume the following facts, if you
will: That the event related to as the snapping of
the head, or the trauma, is cited and noted as having
occurred on or about the 1st of May, 1968. And assume further that the patient reports that for a period of some six weeks prior to that event there was
a noted problem of the eye in the visual field that
he had an inability to see in some of the field area,
or some of the peripheral areas of his sight. That
then the traumatic event occurred, and that four
days thereafter there was the related inability to
see anything except the top of a person's head. And
assume further a prior history of detached vitreous.
Of liquification, as I understand it, of the vitreous.
(Emphasis added)
Q:

Now under those circumstances would you have
an opinion as to whether or not the detachment, as
you have defined for us as being a detachment, was
in existence prior to the traumatic event?

Q:

The same hypothetical question was presented to Dr. Rees
for his opinion. On page 279 of the Record, Attorney Brandt
asked the following question of Dr. Rees:
Assuming, Doctor, the existence of the autolysis condition that you described, and assuming further that there was a report over a period of six
weeks of noted interference with vision, that became
acute three or four days before, with a bullous type
of detachment, with the fluid entry at the holes inQ:
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dicated. Would this be entirely consistent, in your
opinion, with a finding that the detachment had
started at the time of the fluid entry at a period approximately six weeks before you saw the patient?
(Emphasis added)
A: I think this is a well-known sequence of events,
yes.
Then in your opinion, Doctor-as a medical expert in this field-can it be stated, as a reasonable
medical probability, that the events that have been
related here had their onset and the detachment at
a period some six weeks prior to your examination?
(Emphasis added)
Q:

A:

This is a possibility.

Can you state, based upon the facts I have given you, as a reasonable medical probability that is
what took place?
Q:

A: I think that is probably what occurred in this
case. Or in the case you presented. (Emphasis added)
Q:

I have asked you to assume these facts.

A:

All right, yes.

Dr. Rees was further cross-examined on the basis of his opinion by Robert Echard, Attorney for Appellant, and on page
281 beginning at line 14 the doctor said:
Q: I understand you to have stated an opinion that
it's a probability that it was developing from six
weeks before?

A:

Yes.
Q: I'm now asking if that opm10n is based upon
the assumption that there was some significant eye
problems? By that I would mean something
than problems you would normally have, or mmor
complaints about an eye. Is that based upon the as6

sumption that some significant eye problems existed six weeks before? (Emphasis added)
A:

That is based upon the assumption there were

significant or reported eye complaints six weeks before. (Emphasis added)
Q: Now, Doctor, if you would assume the hypothetical as put to you by counsel a minute ago, but
eliminate the complaint over a six-week period of
time preceding this, and instead substitute complaints
only over a six-day period, would your opinion be
the same?

A: My opinion would be that possibly, possibly,
the detachment had occurred in this four or five
days. But probably there were findings, had they
been viewed at a time prior to this, extending for
a period of time prior to it. This is my medical thinking on it. (Emphasis added)
Assuming that approximately six days before
Mr. Pruce came to you he had had a type of trauma
from a whiplash of the head, resulting in headaches
and pains to his neck, and possibly to his back, and
that he then came to you and-upon seeing you six
days later-stated that he had blurred vision for
three or four days. Is it medically probable that the
detached retina which you discovered resulted from
a trauma?
Q:

MR. BRANDT: We'll make the same objection, upon
the further grounds that it doesn't indicate any elimination of facts that are in evidence that there was
a complaint over a six-week period.
MR. ECHARD: Well, I'm asking the hypothetical,
eliminatingA: I don't look at these things usually as being
just a few days in origin, despite that fact. But I
7

certainly think this is possible. And a retaina can
come off in a day, to three or four days. You can
have an extensive detached retina occur.
MR. ECHARD: Q: Assuming my hypothetical
again. Would the close proximity, within six days
of a trauma, be of some significance?
A:

Yes.

Would it have any bearing in your determination of probability of it being caused by trauma, as
opposed to some other developing cause?
A: I'd say this could very well be so.
It is clear from the preceding portion of the transcript that
Dr. Rees' testimony is based entirely on the assumption that
the appellant suffered some problems with his eyes up to
six weeks prior to the date of the industrial accident. Attorney Brandt at no time asked Dr. Rees what his opinion
would have been concerning the detached retina if the information Dr. Rees was relying on concerning eye trouble
six weeks prior to the accident was not correct. It then becomes extremely important to determine whether or not the
information relied upon by Dr. Rees was, in fact, accurate
information. On page 236 of the Record, Dr. Rees indicated
that the appellant's wife accompanied him when he came
to visit the doctor on May 8, 1967. At that point, I objected to
any hearsay evidence being introduced at this hearing and being used at a basis of Dr Rees' testimony. That objection was
taken under advisement by the hearing examiner and Dr.
Rees was allowed to continue with his statement. Dr. Rees,
on the bottom of page 236 states:
A: (Looking at papers.) Mr. Pruce related that for
three to four days the right eye was blurred out.
It started with a safetyglass prescription for bifocals.
This was sort of, I think, when he first noticed it.
But I don't have the date the safety glasses were
provided.
Q:

8

Q:

Do you know by whom they were provided?

A: Nor do I know by whom. I have never done a
refraction, so it was not my prescription. They could
have been just those that are given out at plants
without a correction. Well, no with a bifocal.
Q:

Would you restate that again?

A: All right. "The complaint of the right eye is it
blurred out, and that it started with a safety-glass
prescription for bifocals. But the complaint of poor
vision of the right eye is of three to four days. He
also complained that he had had flashes of light across
both of his visual field." (Emphasis added)

* * *

A: Now as I have tried to nail down how long this
has been present-really for all of our benefit-Mrs.
Pruce corrected Mr. Pruce on the three or four day
thing, to the point that he had been complaining of
trouble for about six weeks.
MR. ECHARD: That is the point I object to, Your
Honor.
THE REFEREE:

I understand.

MR. BRANDT: Q: Now did Mr. Pruce at that
point disagree with her statement?
A:

I don't know. I can't remember.

Q:

Did he agree with her statement?

A:

I don't know. I can't remember.

Beginning on page 268 under my questioning Dr. Rees said
the following:
Q: Now getting back to the information which you
obtained when Mr. Pruce and his wife both were present do I understand correctly that you cannot tell
us
may have made the statement concerning the
six-week period of time?
9

A: I know that Mr. Pruce did not make the statement.
Q: So it had to come from the wife: No one else was
present?

A:

No one else was present.

Q: Now isn't it true also that you did not go into
detail as to exactly what her statement was concerning his visual impairments?

A:

That's true.

Q: And you do not know whether or not she said
that he could only see half of the field of vision?

A:

Well, that is not what she said.

Q:

Okay.

A: She said: "You know you have been having trouble for six weeks," or: "a period of time." (Emphasis
added)
Now isn't it true, Doctor, that a person with eyes
such as Mr. Pruce had, and with the history he had
with his eyes, could have visual problems that would
not be related to the detached retina?
Q:

A:

Yes, sir.

Q: So her statement does not necessarily indicate
that he had any problems related to detached retina?

MR. BRANDT:

Objection. Argumentative.

MR. ECHARD:

A:

THE REFEREE:

Is that correct:

Sustained.

It is clear from the preceding excerpt of the transcript that

Dr. Rees' opinion is based entirely upon the information
which he had concerning the complaint on the part of the
appellant for six weeks prior to the actual injury. The appellant has denied this specifically. In the first hearing, the
10

appellant specifically stated that he had not experienced
any trouble with his eyes other than the unrelated problems
he had a year or so before until after the industrial accident.
(R-Page 40) In the hearing held on December 17, 1970, the
appellant, Charles J. Pruce, specifically stated that he had
not had any problems with his eyes other than the ones experienced the year prior to the industrial accident. (R-Page
288 lines 22 through 25, page 240 ilne 10). The appellant
at that time also stated that he had obtained the bifocal safety glasses, which had been referred to by Dr. Rees, one year
before the industrial accident. Included in the record on page
323 is an Affidavit signed by Mrs. Pruce, the wife of the appellant, specifically stating that she at no time told Dr. Rees
that her husband had been suffering eye problems prior to
the industrial accident. It should be noted that even in Dr.
Rees' notes of what Mrs. Pruce supposedly said he was not
sure whether she said for six weeks or for a period of time.
If, in fact, she said a period of time it could have been referring to the six days from the date of the industrial accident. However, in spite of the fact that the appellant has
steadfastly denied this statement and the fact that Dr. Rees
is far from being clear on this statement and under crossexamination admits that he might be making a mistake concerning this statement, the hearing examiner allowed Dr.
Rees to base his entire opinion upon the information concerning the complaints over a six week period of time. In
addition, the hearing examiner severely limited my ability
to cross-examine the doctor on just how reliable his information was. (R-Page 269 lines 12 through page 273 line 4) The
hearing examiner also prevented me from fully questioning
the doctor concerning whether or not his records in any way
indicated that the appellant had told him about the industrial accident. (R-Page 258 through 260 line 11)
There can be no question about the fact that the hear11

ing examiner in this case allowed hearsay evidence to be introduced at the hearing and allowed this hearsay evidence
to become a vital part of the basis upon which Dr. Rees gave
his opinion. Without the hearsay evidence being allowed and
without Dr. Rees relying upon it he could not and would not
have been able to say that the detached retina was progressive rather than as a result of the industrial accident.
Section 35-1-88 Utah Code Ann. 1953 states:
Rules of evidence and procedure before commission and hearing examiner-Admissible evidence.Neither the commission or (sic) its hearing examiner shall be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules or procedure, other than as herein provided or as adopted by the commission pursuant to this
act. The commission may make its investigation in
such manner as in its judgment is best calculated
to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and
to carry out justly the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in dispute all
evidence deemed material and relevant including but
not limited to the following:

* * *
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians,
or of pathologists.
Section 35-1-88 does not state that the law intended a
hearing examiner to accept statements of hearsay in relation to a mere narrative of past events. The obvious intention
of that section is to make it possible for a medical report of
a doctor to be introduced for the purpose of showing the
physical condition of the appellant. Section 35-1-88 provides
that the commission can accept a report of an employer including time sheets, books, and other records. Certainly this
section was not intended to permit the employer to express
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his opinion of the facts of the case outside of an industrial
hearing nor to permit the employer to relate to the commission a narrative of past events.

It is the appellant's strenuous contention that Section
35-1-88 (b) does not intend to allow a casual statement made
by a doctor when filling a medical report to be the sole basis
for determining the extent of an incident such as that involved in the appellant's case. The case law clearly states that
the purpose for waiving the full common law and statutory
rules of evidence in an industrial hearing is to enable lay members of society if necessary to prosecute proceedings and to
allow as much light as posible to be thrown upon an industrial case. Taslich vs. Industrial Commission 71 U. 33 262 P.
281 and 92 U. 72, 55 P. 2d 124. The waiving of evidentiary
rules cannot be allowed in any way to interfere with an impartial and fair hearing for the appellant. The case law is
quite clear that a hearing examiner cannot base a finding of
fact solely upon hearsay information. In Garfield Smelting
Company vs. Industrial Commission 55 U. 133 178 P. 57 the
Court stated the following:
" . . . although the commission in its investigations
may have recourse to hearsay evidence to assist it
at arriving at real facts,, when it makes its findings
every finding of fact must be based on some substantial legal and competent evidence and every material finding that is entirely based on hearsay or
other incompetent evidence not supported by substantial evidence, cannot be permitted to stand if
reasonably, and properly assailed."
In Ogden Iron Works vs. Industrial Commission 102
U. 492 132 P. 2d 498 the Court stated that declarations and
statements by one employee to another have been held to
be incompetent evidence at a hearing. The Court went on to
say that hearsay evidence concerning an accident which is
13

merely a narrative of a past event with no element of spontaneity is inadmissible.
The case law is quite clear that in considering an industrial application that the hearing examiner is to consider
the facts in the most favorable light to the applicant and when
there is a doubt resolve that doubt in favor of the applicant.
In Ogden Iron Works vs. Industrial Commission 102 U. 492
132 P. 2d 376 the Court declared that Section 35-1-88 U.C.A.
(1953) " . . . does not declare the probative force of any evidence but declares the aid and end of the investigation shall
be to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to
carry out justly the spirit of the title." It is the appellant's
contention that Secion 35-1-88 does not authorize the Industrial Commission to accept hearsay concerning a narrative
of a past event by a doctor, especially where the narrative
of the history is given by the appellant's wife rather than
by the appellant and the appellant's wife is not present at
any of the hearings of this matter.
The appellant had no way of knowing that Mrs. Pruce
should have been at one of the hearings in order to obtain
her testimony, since it was not clear until the hearings on
December 17, 1970, that the defense intended to base its
objection upon a hearsay statement. The appellant could not
have anticipated that the hearing examiner would overrule
its motion on the hearsay statement or even that the subject
would have been introduced and, consequently, had no opportunity to arrange for Mrs. Pruce to be present to shed light
on the issue.
II.

THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDERS ISSUED BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE NOT IN CONFORMANCE
WITH THE ACTUAL FACTS AND TESTIMONY
14

PRESENTED AT THE VARIOUS HEARINGS HAD
IN THIS MATTER.
On page three of the Industrial Commission Order dated February 19, 1971, Mr. Sumsion states that the objective
medical findings in this case are not in dispute and that both
the medical panel and the treating physician agree on the
pertinent medical theories and that the conclusions of both
the medical panel and treating physicians are consistent and
plausible. (R-Page 294) This conclusion on the part of Mr.
Sumsion is not supported by the testimony of the doctors.
In the first place, it was the medical panel's unanimous decision and opinion that the appellant had as a reasonable
medical probability suffered a detached retina as a result of
the landing gear episode. (R-Page 172) It was Dr. Rees' opinion that the appellant did not suffer his detached retina as a
result of the landing gear episode. Dr. Rees stated that it was
his opinion that the detached retina resulted from a progressive process which predated the landing gear episode. Dr. Rees
also stated that he did not know of the landing gear episode
or at least cannot recall whether or not he was told about the
landing gear episode and that had he known about it he would
have disregarded it as a major factor in the appellant's detachment. (R-page 286 lines 4 through 16) Dr. Sonntag stated
that it was his opinion and the opinion of the medical panel
that the trauma experienced by the appellant involving the
landing gear episode was the conspicuous and exciting incident which caused the detachment. (R-Page 218 lines 15
through 25) Dr. Rees, in reaching his opinion, places a great
deal of reliance upon symptoms he believes Mr. Pruce suffered prior to the date of the industrial accident. This assumption on the part of Dr. Rees is based upon a hearsay statement which has already been discussed. Dr. Sonntag testified
that the events prior to the industrial accident which were relied so heavily upon by Dr. Rees would not have affected his
15

opinion at all. (R-Page 212 line 3 through 15) In reviewing
Dr. Rees' and Dr. Sonntag's testimony, it appears that the
doctors are in disagreement as to the cause of the detached
retina and are also in disagreement as to the relevance of
the various facts upon which their opinion is based. It is extremely difficult to see how Mr. Sumsion could find that the
opinions and conclusions of Dr. Rees and the medical panel
are " ... entirely consistent and plausible, though different."
The hearing examiner in his order indicated that the
commission normally gives greater weight to the findings and
conclusions of the medical panel in contrast to the opinion of
the treating physician. The examiner then concludes that
that rule, however, will not be followed in this case because
the examining physician was in a better position than the
medical panel to assess the probable cause of the appellant's
detached retina. It is the appellant's contention that this conclusion on the part of the examiner is completely unfounded.
Dr. Rees' treatment of the appellant began on September 1,
1955, and continued through March 17, 1864. During that
period of time, the appellant was seen on seven different
occasions, either by Dr. Rees or by his partner, for the specific purpose of removing foreign bodies from the appellant's
eye. Dr. Rees testified in the hearing that he did not treat or
examine the appellant during that period of time for anything
except for the purpose of removing foreign objects from the
eye. Dr. Rees also stated that foreign bodies on the surface
of the eye for which he treated the appellant could not in
any way affect or cause the detached retina suffered by the
appellant. (R-Page 261 lines 14 through 25) The doctor also
stated that prior to May 8, 1967, there was absolutely nothing in the appellant's medical history that was known to the
doctor which would have caused the detached retina. (R-Page
261 lines 19 through 23) Dr. Rees saw the appellant on May
8, 1967, at which time the appelalnt complained of a dark
16

spot on his right eye. The doctor examined the appellant on
that date and on May 20, 1967, observed an operculum in
the vitreous and a detached vitreous. There were two opacities in the right eye. The doctor requested the appellant to
return on June 24, 1967, for further examination, at which
time the doctor determined that the appellant did not have
a detachment of the retina and that he had 20-20 vision of
each eye. (R-Page 230 lines 15 through 25, page 231 lines 1
through 2) After June 24, 1967, Dr. Rees did not see the appellant until after the industrial accident or injury which is
the subject of this hearing. Both Dr. Sonntag and Dr. Rees
testified at the hearing that opacities, dark spots, or holes
in the retina and a detached vitreous or an operculum in the
vitreous do not necessarily mean that an individual will suffer from a detached retina. Both doctors also testified that
dark spots and detached vitreous are common to many individuals and that these conditions do not have to progress
to a detached retina. (R-Page 209 lines 1 through 12, page
211 lines 19 through 21, page 248 lines 14 through 19, and
page 262 lines 23 through 25, page 263 lines 2 through 23)
In fact, Dr. Rees stated specifically that the macula, which
was the part of the retina which detached and which caused
Mr. Pruce to be aware of his eye problem, was not pulled
off by the shrinking or the detachment of the vitreous in his
eye. (R-Page 277 lines 13 through 18) In addition, Dr. Rees
specifically states that the holes in the appellant's retina
could have been caused by trauma as well as autolysis. (RPage 278 lines 19 through 25, page 299 lines 1 through 13)
It is clear from the testimony of both doctors that the

condition observed by Dr. Rees in the appellant's eye on June
24 1967 the last occasion on which Dr. Rees saw the appel' prior' to his industrial accident, cannot be said to be the
Iant
cause of his detached retina. There is, of course, some possibilitiy that these conditions could lead to a detached retina
17

and both Dr. Rees and Dr. Sonntag testified that these conditions could make the appellant more susceptible to an injury that would cause his retaina to detach. However, Dr. Rees
stated that on June 24, 1967, that the appellant definitely did
not have a detached retina. The only other time that Dr. Rees
saw the appellant was within four to six days after the industrial accident. Dr. Rees then treated the appellant for
the detached retina. Dr. Sonntag and the medical panel which
examined the appellant were in possession of all of the hospital records and all of Dr. Rees' records concerning Dr. Rees'
treatment of the applicant after the industrial accident. In
addition, the panel independently examined the appellant and
drew the conclusion, after their study of the case and examination of the appellant, that the appellant's detached retina
as a medical probability was caused by the industrial accident. Mr. Sumsion in his Order states that Dr. Rees was in
a better position than the medical panel to assess the probable cause of the appellant's detached retina. Dr. Rees had
no additional information before him other than that which
the panel had when it examined the appellant. Dr. Rees, contrary to the impression given by Mr. Sumsion in his report,
did not examine the appellant on a regular basis after first
noticing the detached vitreous on May 19, 1967. Dr. Rees had
no way of knowing whether this eye condition became better or worse prior to the accident which was suffered by Mr.
Pruce. Dr. Sonntag was fully aware of the eye conditions
experienced by Mr. Pruce in May, 1967, and he was also aware
of Dr. Rees' opinion that on June 24, 1967, the appellant did
not have a detached retina. All of this information was included in Dr. Rees' report which was submitted to the Industrial Commission and forwarded to the medical panel for
its consideration. (R-Page 17 and 21) In addition to the information which Dr. Rees had, Dr. Sonntag and the medical
panel also had the information concerning the appellant's
18

industrial injury and the jarring incident resulting from the
landing gear episode. Dr. Rees stated in the hearing that he
did not know of this and that his opinion was not based upon
this information. (R-Page 255 lines 1 through 16, page 258
lines 3 through 25) Therefore, if anything, Dr. Rees had less
information to proceed on and to draw a conclusion from than
did the medical panel. In light of all of this information, it
is very difficult to understand how the hearing examiner in
this case could conclude that Dr. Rees' report should be accepted and the medical panel's opinion disregarded because
Dr. Rees was in a better position to form an opinion. It is
the appellant's contention that the normal rule followed by
the commission, wherein it gives greater weight to the finding and conclusions of the medical panel than to the findings and conclusions of the independent doctor should, in
fact, apply in this case as there was no reason to suspend the
operation of that rule. In fact, there seems to be more reason in this case to follow the opinion of the medical panel
than in most. The fact that the appellant's physician holds
an opinion that is detirmental to the appellant certainly should
not cause the commission to view his opinion with more
weight than it would that of the medical panel. To allow this
would be to approach the evaluation of all the facts presented in the appellant's case in a manner that is biased against
the appellant. Such an approach would not be in conformance
with the rules and regulations that control the hearing of
an industrial case .. The examiner is supposed to be completely impartial in evaluating all the facts and evidence that comes
to his attention. In this case, regardless of the examiner's
reasons, he is accepting the opinion of one doctor over that
of three doctors who are as informed as the appellant's doctor.
In evaluating the factual situation as established by the
appellant's testimony, the hearing examiner, Richard G. Sum19

sion, in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order dated the 19th day of February, 1971, on page 2 of that
document concluded that the episode involving the landing
gear in which the appellant was injured was not particularly
significant ". . . and had it not been for the fact that shortly
thereafter the appellant became aware of the serious problem with his eyesight, no one would have thought any more
about it, including the appellant himself." (R-Page 295) This
is a very interesting statement on the part of the hearing
examiner and seems to set the tenor for the entire approach
the examiner took towards the appellant's case. The facts as
brought out at the various hearings clearly indicated that the
appellant reported the incident to his supervisor and to other
employees immediately after it had occurred. (R-Page 39
lines 19 through 25, page 45 lines 18 through 23, page 46
lines 13 through 24, page 53 lines 3 through page 54 line 22)
The examiner from his comment gave the impression that
a person must recognize an accident as being particularly
significant and constituting an industrial accident prior to
realizing he suffered an injury from the accident. In fact,
just the reverse is true. Seldom, if ever, does an individual
view an incident or accident as being significant unless he
suffers some injury therefrom. This case involves an injury
which was not readily discernible at the very beginning. In
fact, Dr. Rees as well as Dr. Sonntag in their testimony indicated that the sequence of events from the date of the industrial injury until the examination by Dr. Rees of the appellant was a normal process to be expected in an injury of
this nature. (R-Page 213 lines 8 through 24, page 273 lines
5 through 15) It is interesting that Dr. Rees also seems to
apply a great deal of significance to the fact that the appellant did not immediately recognize the situation as an industrial injury which should be reported to the Industrial
Commission. On page 274 lines 12 through 20, Dr. Rees states
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that he does not believe Mr. Pruce knew whether he wanted
to go industrial or private carrier. Both the hearing examiner
and Dr. Rees seem to put unusual stress upon the fact that
the appellant should have known at the time he discovered
his injury that this was caused by an industrial accident.
Even the doctors who examined and treated Mr. Pruce are
not in complete agreement as to the cause of Mr. Pruce's
injury. Why then should the fact that the appellant was unable to determine at the very beginning the cause of his
problem in any way affect his claim and be viewed by the
hearing examiner in an unfavorable manner towards the appellant.
The Industrial Commission in its denial of the appellant's Motion for Review among other things based its decision upon the fact that the appellant in a claim dated May
24, 1968, and signed by the appellant, Charles Joseph Pruce,
answered two questions on that claim indicating that his injury was not due to employment and that he did not intend
to file for Workmen's Compensation. (R-Page 334) It is interesting to note that Mr. Pruce did not fill out the form that
the Industrial Commission refers to. In fact, Mr. Fred R. Sterling, the office manager for the Fruehauf Corporation, filled
out that form. (R-Page 99 lines 1 through page 100 line 13)
On page 100 and 101, Mr. Sterling states that he filled in the
blanks in the form and then presented that form for Mr
Pruce's signature. Mr. Sterling also stated that at the time
he filled out the form he did not know if Mr. Pruce's injury
was related to his employment or not and that he took all
of the information from Dr. Rees' report. The appellant, Mr.
Pruce, testified that at the time he signed the claim, dated
May 24, 1968, and refered to by Mr. Sterling, he was blind
folded and that he did not read that claim .. (R-Page 116 lines
1 through page 117 line 25) In light of the testimony presented before the Industrial Commission, it is difficult to
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understand how the Commission could use the information
on the claim filed on May 24, 1968, in a detrimental manner
to Mr. Pruce. The Commission also states that their decision is based partially upon the fact that the appellant indicated Connecticut as the responsible carrier when he was admitted to the hospital. In fact, the industrial insurance carrier was Continental Casualty; and the health insurance carrier for the Fruehauf Corporation was Connecticut Life. Mr.
Pruce testified that he did not know which company was the
industrial insurance carrier. (R-Page 66 lines 10 through 25)
In fact, on an industrial accident claim filled out and signed
by Mr. Pruce, which is page 150 of the Report, Mr. Pruce
named Connecticut Life as the industrial insurance carrier. (R-Page 66 lines 10 through 25) It is clear to see that
many of the facts relied upon by the Industrial Commission
in its denial of the appellant's Motion for Review and in the
Order issued by Mr. Sumsion were not correct but were relied upon by the Commission to reach its conclusion.

III.
THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDERS ISSUED BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE IN DIRECT VIOLATION
OF RULES WHICH CONTROL A DECISION BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AS SET UP BY THE
UTAH SUPREME COURT AND IN VIOLATION OF
THE SPIRIT OF THE HEARING OF AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
The Utah State Supreme Court has set up many rules
concerning industrial hearings and the presumption that
ought to be used in those hearings. One of the rules of law
that is clearly established by the case law is that an accident
can consist of aggravating or accelerating an existing injury or disease. In Ewell vs. Industrial 120 U. 671, 238 P.
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2d 414 the Court said that where a preexisting diseased
condition of an eye was aggravated by a flash burn and,
therefore, made surgery necessary. The flash burn, in fact,
was an industrial accident for which the applicant could be
compensated in spite of the fact that the diseased condition
of the eye existed prior to the accident. A similar ruling has
been stated in many other cases decided by this Court. Tintic
Mill Comoanv vs. Industrial Commission 60 U. 14, 206 P. 278;
Utah-Idaho Cent. R. Co. vs. Industrial Commission 71 U. 490,
267, P. 785; Makoff Company vs. Industrial Commission 13
U. 23, 368, P. 70; Jones vs. California Packing Corporation
121 U. 612, 244 P. 640. Under the rule established by these
cases, the fact that the appellant, Mr. Pruce might have had
a preexisting eye disease or problem would not in an way
preclude the applicant from recovering if as a result of the
industrial accident complainted of by the applicant, the eye
condition was aggravated or accelerated causing him to suffer a detached retina. Dr. Rees could not and did not say that
the industrial accident did not aggravate or accelerate this
injury, whereas Dr. Sonntag and the medical panel said specifically that it was a medical probability that the industrial
accident did cause the detached retina. (R-page 172)
The Utah State Supreme Court has clearly held that the
Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed
and that if there is any doubt respecting the right to compensation by an applicant such doubt should be resolved in
favor of the injured employee. Park Utah Consol. Mines Co.
vs. Industrial Commission 84 U. 481, 36 P. 2d 979. If, in fact,
Dr. Rees' opinion is acceptable and based upon valid information, which the appellant contends is not the case, then
there is still an issue raised by the fact that three medical
specialists believe the appellant suffered his injury as a result of the industrial accident, that issue should be resolved
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in favor of the appellant as indicated in the cases cited above.
DATED this 29th day of November, 1971.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Applicant-Appellant
Charles J. Pruce.
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